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Abstract
Theoretical models predict a positive impact of the level of individual wealth
on the job exit probability. Empirically this prediction is most likely to be relevant
for elderly workers who have accumulated wealth throughout their working life
and have a short residual working life. In the Netherlands, as in other European
countries, there is a policy debate about the introduction of more individual free-
dom of choice in pension schemes. The individual level of wealth will become an
increasingly important factor in the retirement decision. Therefore it is relevant to
know whether workers with a different financial situation make different job exit
decisions, given other factors. Empirical analysis of job exit behaviour of elderly
workers so far has concentrated on properties of the pension system and health
status. For a sample of elderly male workers in the Netherlands in the period 1995
through 2001, we analyse the impact of wealth, savings, and debt position on job
exit rates. We find evidence for a positive effect of wealth on the probability to
retire (early).
1 We are greatly indebted to Statistics Netherlands for providing the data. Earlier versions of this
paper were presented at the Netspar Pension Day February 2006, The CPB Netherlands Bureau for
Economic Policy Analysis, and the Netspar Workshop Microeconomics of Aging in Europe. We thank
Arthur van Soest, Daniel van Vuuren, Matthew Wakefield, and other seminar participants for their
comments. All errors are mine.
2 email: hbloemen@feweb.vu.nl, phone: +31 20 5986037, fax: +31 20 5986005
3 Tinbergen Institute, Netspar, IZA.
11 Introduction
Labour market participation rates in the Netherlands typically tend to decrease once
workers have passed the age of 50. Empirical analysis of the outflow of elderly workers
out of the labor market has focused on the financial incentives created by social insurance
and early retirement systems.4 Structural empirical models of retirement behavior, as,
for instance, the model by Stock and Wise (1990), also concentrate on the properties of
the retirement system on the job exit decision.
So far evidence on the impact of the private level of wealth on the decision to retire is
scarce. It becomes increasingly interesting to gain insight in the empirical impact of the
financial situation on the decision to exit the labour market as recent policy measures in
the Netherlands aim at more individual flexibility in the choice to retire from the labour
market.
Theoretical models on savings and labor market transitions by Blundell, Magnac and
Meghir (1997), and Danforth (1979) incorporate the role of wealth on the flows out
of unemployment, while the first study also addresses the relation between wealth and
the flow out of employment. It predicts that workers with a higher level of wealth will
have a higher probability of job exit, given other factors. This result holds for any
worker, and is not specific to the retirement decision of elderly workers. The model also
predicts a negative relation between the level of wealth and the transition probability
from unemployment to employment, and the influence of wealth on the transitions in the
different directions come from the same source: therefore evidence of a negative impact
of wealth on the flow out of unemployment is indirect evidence of a positive impact
of wealth on the flow out of employment, provided that the model structure holds.
Woolley (2004) explicitly models the retirement decision, along with an intertemporal
wealth accumulation relation, and the model also predicts that a higher level of wealth
increases the probability of retirement.
Empirical evidence by Stancanelli (1999), Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001), and Bloe-
men (2002) shows that there is an impact of wealth on the flow from unemployment
4 See Kapteyn and De Vos (1998), and Lindeboom (1998) for studies for the Netherlands.
2into employment. However, there is little direct evidence on the impact of savings on
the exit out of the labor market of elderly workers. Bloemen (2002) measures the im-
pact of wealth on the transition from employment to nonemployment for male workers
in the age range of 20 to 64 and finds a negative impact of wealth on the transition
out of employment, which is opposite to the effect predicted by theory. The possible
explanation for the opposite effect that is provided is that wealth may serve as a proxy
for unobserved heterogeneity: someone with a high level of wealth may have favourable
charactertistics that makes him more likely to stay on the job during working life. To
address this issue Bloemen (2002) specifies a joint model of wealth and labour market
transitions that includes unobserved heterogeneity, by allowing for random effects, initial
conditions, and endogeneity of wealth. The estimates of the model specification show
a smaller positive effect of wealth on the stay-on probability. A critisicm on this joint
dynamic random effects model for wealth and labour market transition is that economic
theory hardly provides suitable (non-parametric) exclusion restrictions for identification.
For this reason, in this paper we aim to control for observed heterogeneity as much as
possible using a rich set of regressors.
Studying the impact of wealth on the job exit probability is likely to be more relevant
if we focus on the job exit behaviour of elderly workers. Someone aged, say, 30 still is
many years away from the usual retirement age of 65, and there will be few workers
of that age that have already accumulated a sufficient amount of wealth to finance the
daily necessities for 35 years. Many job exit transitions at earlier age in working life are
lay-offs rather than quits. Blundell et al. (1997) model the staying-on probability as
the product of a job offer probability and a job acceptance decision. Wealth thus enters
the transition probability by the job acceptance decision but if job exit is dominated by
quits, it is hard to empirically identify the impact of wealth on job exit, escpecially if
unobserved heterogeneity in the wealth level is correlated with lay-offs. Bloemen (2002)
only analyses job exit, and not the reason for the job exit. Moreover, a job quit may
induce the loss of pension rights. If workers with a high level of wealth tend to have
more favorable jobs with better pension arrangements, it will be unlikely that we will
find a positive impact of wealth on the job exit rate.
3In this paper we estimate the empirical impact of wealth on the job exit behaviour
of elderly workers. For this purpose we use a subsample of the data from the Socio
Economic Panel, collected by Statistics Netherlands. We use a sample of male workers
in the age range of 48 to 64. We consider exit out of employment to various exit states.
There are several factors that complicate the measurement of the impact of wealth on
exit out of the labor market. Search theory emphasizes the impact of the income on
the job, frictions on the labor market and the possibility of involuntary exit. Moreover,
eligibility conditions for benefits in the state of inactivity may be a dominant factor in
determining the job exit decision. The survey contains information on reasons for job
exit and we will exploit this information in the empirical analysis. We use a multinomial
choice framework in which the individual may exit by different exit routes, or may
stay employed. We use a reduced form regression model, as our purpose is to try and
measure whether wealth has an impact on job exit rates, without a priori imposing such
a relationship. To isolate the impact of wealth from other factors we use a rich set of
regressors. We include, among other, information on fixed term contracts, participation
in employee or individual pension schemes, and the wage of the current job. We will use
different measures for wealth, savings, and debt position.
In section 2 we present a simplified economic model that serves as a background to
motivate our empirical specification. The model shows which factors are relevant in
taking the job exit decision, and generates predictions on both the impact of wealth
and the impact of the wage income on the job exit decision. Section 3 provides a
brief description of the pension system in the Netherlands. In section 4 we present
the data. Section 5 contains the empirical analysis. We present the empirical model,
the estimation results, and elasticities of job exit probabilities with respect to wealth.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
In this section we present a simple economic model that includes both the savings de-
cision and the decision to retire. The purpose of this section is to make explicit which
4factors influence the decision to exit from employment, and serves as a guideline for the
specification of our empirical model.
In our model an individual makes choices in three subsequent periods. The three
periods can be interpreted as three phases in life. In the first period the individual is
employed, earns an income, accumulates pension wealth, spends income on consumption,
and saves or borrows. In the second period, the individual can choose to stop or to
continue working. If the individual continues working, he continues accumulating pension
wealth, and continues receiving wage income. If the individual stops working he receives
a benefit income, that may depend on past earnings (the wage income in period 1).
Typically, the benefit income will be lower than the earnings. In the final period, there
is mandatory retirement, and the individual does not work. Needless to say, the model
can be further refined. For instance, in the middle period the individual may choose
among different states of inactivity associated with different eligibility rules and different
benefit levels, but for the purpose of showing the mechanisms by which private wealth
enters the decision we stick to the three period framework.
Individual preferences are expressed by an intratemporal utility function U(Cτ , dτ)
defined over consumption Cτ and labour market state dτ (dτ = 1 if employed, dτ = 0 if
inactive) in periode τ . There is a constant rate of time preference ρ, and we label the
three periods 0, 1, and 2. Given the above assumptions d0 = 1 and d2 = 0. Net wealth
at the beginning of period τ is indicated by Aτ . The interest rate is constant and equal
to r. Income in period τ is indicated by yτ . Thus, we have the following intratemporal
budget constraint:
Cτ = yτ + rAτ +Aτ − Aτ+1, τ = 0, 1, 2, with A3 = 0 (1)
The objective of the individual is the maximization of the expected intertemporal
utility5
E
2∑
τ=0
(
1
1 + ρ
)τ
U(Cτ , dτ ) (2)
For income in period 1 we have that y1 = Y (d1, y0), which indicates that the income
depends on the labour market state chosen and that the level of earnings in period 0
5 Uncertainty may arise due to uncertainty in future income.
5affects the level of income, for instance, because it determines the benefit level. Similary,
we denote income in period 2 as y2 = b(y1, d1) = b(Y (d1, y0), d1). Thus, the labour market
state in the previous period determines the final pension benefit, as do the earnings levels
in the previous periods. We make the following assumptions about the income processes:
Y (1, y0) > Y (0, y0),
∂Y (d1, y0)
∂y0
> 0,
∂b(y1, d1)
∂y1
> 0, b(y1, 1) > b(y1, 0) (3)
The first inequality in (3) says that the income of someone working in period 1 is higher
than the income of someone retired in period 1, so there is a financial payoff to continue
working. The second inequality says that someone with higher earnings in working life
(period 0) will also have higher income in period 1, irrespective of the labour market
state in period 1. The third and fourth inequality state that a higher income in period
1 and employment status in period 1 both imply a higher pension benefit in period 2.
Together with inequality 1, this indicates that there is an additional incentive to continue
working in period 1, as not only period 1 income will be higher, but also the eventual
pension benefit. Note that the loss of pension rights can be incorporated in the notation.
Loss of pension rights or ineligibility to (early) retirement benefits can be denoted as
b(y1, 0) ≡ 0 or Y (0, y0) ≡ 0.
The model outlined contains both the consumption/savings decision, and the decision
to retire early. In the absence of liquidity constraints, the Euler equation for consumption
holds and the model implies consumption smoothing:
∂U(Cτ , dτ )
∂Cτ
=
1 + r
1 + ρ
Eτ
∂U (Cτ+1, dτ+1)
∂Cτ+1
, τ = 0, 1, 2 (4)
The assumptions (3) imply that income decreases on retirement so consumption can be
smoothed by decumulating savings.6
In period 1 the decision to retire early is taken. Let V1(A1, y0; d1) indicate the value
function in period 1, conditional on choosing labour market state d1, and let C
d1
τ , τ = 1, 2
and Ad12 denote optimal choices conditional on d1: they satisfy the Euler equation (4).
6 In the empirical literature on consumption upon retirement evidence shows that upon retirement the
retired do not always smooth consumption (see, for instance, Hamermesh (1984) and Alessie, Lusardi,
and Kapteyn (1999)).
6Then we write the value function as
V1(A1, y0; d1) = U(C
d1
1 , d1) +
1
1 + ρ
E1U (C
d1
2 , 0) (5)
with
Cd11 = Y (d1, y0) + (1 + r)A1 − A
d1
2
Cd12 = b(Y (d1, y0), d1) + (1 + r)A
d1
2
(6)
The decision to retire early can be characterized as
If V1(A1, y0; 0)− V1(A1, y0; 1) > 0 : stop working
If V1(A1, y0; 0)− V1(A1, y0; 1) ≤ 0 : continue working
(7)
To evaluate the impact of the level of wealth A1 on the decision to retire early, we
consider
∂V1(A1, y0; 0)
∂A1
−
∂V1(A1, y0; 1)
∂A1
=
∂U(C0
1
, 0)
∂C1
−
∂U(C1
1
, 1)
∂C1
(8)
Although the presentation of the model in this section is somewhat different, the result
by Blundell, Magnac, and Meghir (1997) can be applied to (8): if the value function in
(5) is concave in A1 and if
7
∂2U (Cτ , dτ )
∂Cτ∂dτ
< 0 (9)
then expression (8) is positive, indicating that the option to leave the job becomes more
attractive relative to the option to stay on the job the higher is the level of wealth A1.
Thus, the probability to exit the job will be higher, the higher is the level of wealth.
This result (i.e. the qualitative result that the impact of wealth on job exit is positive)
does not depend on the shape of the income relations Y (d1, y0) and b(y1, d1), except for
the fact that replacement rates are assumed to be smaller than 1: income is smaller in
the state of inactivity. This is because the level of wealth does not influence the level
of benefits in the state on inactivity. However, the quantitative impact of wealth on the
job exit will be effected by the shape of Y (d1, y0) and b(y1, d1). For instance, the higher
are replacement rates, the closer will be C0
1
and C1
1
in (8) and the impact of wealth on
the job exit decision may become smaller.
7 Note that (9) implies that the marginal utility of consumption at a given consumption level is
higher if the individual has full leisure compared to the situation in which the individual is working.
7Thus, under some regularity conditions, the model implies that the decision to exit
the job will be positively influenced by the level of wealth, given everything else. Some
comments are in order. The model formulated so far concentrates on job exit as a decision
by the worker: wealth enters the job exit rate because it affects the choice of the worker.
However, workers not always exit jobs by choice. Demand side factors may force them to
leave the job. It is straightforward to extend the model with an exogenous layoff rate,8
in which case the job exit rate consists of the layoff rate and the choice probability to
exit the job. This weakens the relation between the job exit rate and the level of wealth,
but the theory does still predict a positive relationship. For an empirical analysis it is
desirable to be able to observe the distinction between a forced job exit and a job exit by
choice. On the other hand, in the discussion about job exit routes for elderly workers in
the Netherlands, the unemployment benefit system and the disability insurance system
are often mentioned as financially attractive exit routes for workers who are not (yet)
eligible for a pension. Workers need to satisfy the eligibility rules of these systems, but
a choice element by the worker may not be entirely absent.
Another factor that complicates the empirical measurement of the level of wealth on
job exit are the eligibility rules and incentives of the early retirement system. Kapteyn
and De Vos (1998) show that the early retirement system provides strong incentives to
exit the labour force as soon as the early retirement age has been reached. If the rules of
the early retirement system dominate the choice to retire early, the role of other factors
may be limited.
Due to these considerations, we do not limit our analysis to one specific exit route.
We will analyse the impact of wealth on the job exit rates of employed males in the
entire age range of 48 through 64, and we allow for any reason of job exit (except death,
in which case sample attrition occurs). The data allow us to make a rough distinction
between various reasons of job exit and we will exploit this distinction in our empirical
analysis.
The model outlined so far also enables us to analyse the effect of labour income y0,
that enters the value function (5), on the decision to exit from work. Without a life
8 See Blundell et al. (1997).
8cycle model framework, it is tempting to think that a higher labour income y0 makes
it more attractive to stay on the job.9 However, a higher labour income increases the
entire life cycle budget, and, under an assumption like (9), a higher life cycle budget will
make it more attractive to consume full leisure and to stop working. But the assumed
impact (3) of the labour income and the labour market state on the early retirement
benefits Y (d1, y0) and the pension benefits b(y1, d1) determine the negative incentives
to stop working of a higher labour income during working life. To be more specific,
we evaluate the impact of labour income y0 on the job exit decision, determined by
V1(A1, y0; 0)− V1(A1, y0; 1):
∂V1(A1, y0; 0)
∂y0
−
∂V1(A1, y0; 1)
∂y0
=
∂U (C01 , 0)
∂C1
∂Y (0, y0)
∂y0
−
∂U(C11 , 1)
∂C1
∂Y (1, y0)
∂y0
+
+
1
1 + ρ
E1
[
∂U(C0
2
, 0)
∂C2
∂b(Y (0, y0), 0)
∂y0
−
∂U(C1
2
, 0)
∂C2
∂b(Y (1, y0), 1)
∂y0
]
(10)
Making use of the Euler equation (4), together with the assumption that the retirement
benefit (system) is completely known in period 1, we can rewrite (10) as
∂V1(A1, y0; 0)
∂y0
−
∂V1(A1, y0; 1)
∂y0
=
∂U(C01 , 0)
∂C1
[
∂Y (0, y0)
∂y0
+
1
1 + r
∂b(Y (0, y0), 0)
∂y0
]
−
∂U (C11 , 1)
∂C1
[
∂Y (1, y0)
∂y0
+
1
1 + r
∂b(Y (1, y0), 1)
∂y0
]
(11)
The impact (11) of the wage on the job exit decision has something in common with the
impact (8) of wealth on the job exit decision: it contains the difference in the marginal
utility of consumption in period 1 in the two labour market states. But the impact
(11) of the wage adds some factors to this difference. We know that under the given
assumptions (8) is positive. The questions is: (how) do the factors added in (11) change
the sign? First, we know that if the replacement ratio of the early retirement system is
smaller than 1, we have
∂Y (0, y0)
∂y0
<
∂Y (1, y0)
∂y0
(12)
9 For instance, in job search models with on-the-job search, the reservation wage of the present job
is determined by the current wage and consequently it is less likely that someone decides to exit from
that job the higher is the wage.
9and if early retirement decreases the pension benefit in period 2 due to, say smaller
premium payments in period 1, we have
∂b(Y (0, y0), 0)
∂y0
<
∂b(Y (1, y0), 1)
∂y0
(13)
Thus, (12) and (13) imply that (11) is smaller than (8), and may even become negative
if replacement rates are small enough. Summarizing, we can say that there are two
opposing effects of the wage on the job exit decision. The first effect is the life cycle
income effect. This effect is comparable to the effect of wealth on the job exit decision
(8) and implies a positive influence of the wage income y0 on the probability of job exit.
There is a second, opposing, influence on the job exit probability that will make the total
effect smaller or even negative, depending on the size of the replacement rates of early
retirement and on the influence of the early retirement decision on final pension benefits:
the smaller are the replacement rates, the smaller will become the impact of the wage
income on the job exit rate. If the early retirement decision has no consequences for
the pension benefits in period 2 and/or if the replacement rate of the early retirement
system is large, which is typically the case in the Netherlands, the opposing negative
effect will be small and a positive effect of the wage on the decision to retire early may
prevail.
3 Pension system and exit routes in the Netherlands
We give a brief overview of the pension system in the Netherlands. Someone retired may
receive pension income from different resources. There is the state pension,10 comparable
to Social Security in the United States, and there are employer provided pension schemes.
The early retirement system is also an employer provided facility.
Every individual in the Netherlands who has reached the age of 65 receives the state
pension, irrespective of labour market state, other sources of pension income, or private
wealth. Single individuals receive 70 percent of the minimum wage. A couple receives
100 percent of the minimum wage. There is an addition for households with dependent
children.
10 The “AOW”.
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Employed individuals participate in an employer provided pension scheme. Premium
contribution is mandatory so in that sense it resembles a public pension system. How-
ever, rules of the pension system may vary from sector to sector. But there are many
similarities between the sector. The pension schemes are of the defined benefit type, and
pension benefit incomes depend on the final wage. The usual age of retirement is 65.
Financing is mostly fully funded.
Early retirement benefits are also employer provided and sector specific. Differences
between sectors show up in the age of eligibility and the replacement rate. In most
sectors the age of eligibility is in the range of 57 through 62, with the age of 60 as the
most common age. Replacement rates are between 70 and 85 percent of final earnings,
with a concentration around 80 percent. Common to all sectors is that for eligibility job
tenure has to be 10 years or more and that full withdrawal from the labour market is
required.11
Kapteyn and De Vos (1998) notice that the early retirement pension system is not
the only destination of elderly workers that exit the job. The exit rate into disabil-
ity rises with age. Other workers enter the unemployment insurance system and once
unemployed, reemployment rates of eldery workers are very low. Kapteyn and De Vos
(1998) suggest that there may be a link between exit into these states and the financial
incentives provided by the corresponding benefit systems. The replacement rate of both
the disability insurance system and the unemployment insurance system is 70 percent
of the previous wage. The entitlement period depends on labour market history, and
for eldery workers with a long labour market history entitlement to unemployment in-
surance benefits can be 60 months. On the other hand there are eligibility rules for
obtaining benefits. To obtain disability insurance benefits, a medical examiner has to
qualify the worker as insuitable for the job on medical grounds. Especially in the eight-
ies formal eligibility rules were loosely interpreted, as a transition into disability was a
mutual beneficial deal for worker and employer. In the meanwhile the interpretation of
11 Until 1999, early retirement benefits were financed by a pay-as-you-go system. From 1999 on,
the early retirement systems of the different sectors were gradually replaced by funded systems, and
employees obtained some, limited, choice to determine premium contributions, thereby influencing the
pension benefits and the age of eligibility. These changes are not yet relevant for our sample.
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medical eligibility grounds has been sharpened and a system of experience rating was
introduced in disability insurance. To obtain unemployment benefits, a worker has to
become formally unemployed. In this paper we will distiniguish job exit into disability
and unemployment as separate exit routes from retirement for two reasons. If there is a
mutual beneficial deal of exit into one of these systems, there may be a choice element in
the job exit transition and the level of wealth may play a role. But, second, if disability is
entirely accidental and governed by bad health and if unemployment is truly involuntary,
the job exit transition is not the result of choice and economic theory does not predict
a causal effect between the job exit and the level of private wealth.
4 The data
We use data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1995 through 2002.
This panel survey was initiated in 1984, but through the years there have been minor
and major changes in the setup. The first six years, 1984-1989, questionnaires were
conducted twice a year, in april and october, while income data was collected in the
october wave. The year 1987 was the first year in which data on assets and debts were
collected. In 1990 the setup was changed and data were collected each year in May. Also
the collection of income data changed considerably. So far income had been collected in
terms of net income earned in the month of the survey. From 1990 on the survey in May
collects income on the previous fiscal (calendar) year, and the information resembles the
information that individuals need to provide to the tax authorities each year. Information
on earnings is expressed in gross earnings per year, with separate information on taxes
paid. In the early nineties there were no major changes in the survey anymore, but the
formulation of survey questions was not entirely stable from wave to wave. We chose to
use data from the periods 1995 through 2002 as questions on participation in pension
schemes and reasons for job exit were available and stable through these years. The
year 2002 is the final year in which the survey was conducted. No more information is
collected for subsequent years: the survey has stopped now.
To construct our data, we selected male individuals appearing in any of the survey
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waves in 1995 through 2001 in the age range of 48 through 64 who report to be employed.
We use the subsequent wave to check the labour market state of the same individuals
in the next year. An important condition is that information on the same individual
is present in the next wave. Individuals that are subject to attrition of any kind are
dropped from the data. This requires the assumption that unobserved factors in the
attrition process are uncorrelated with unobservables in the determination of the labour
market state. Thus, we can determine whether an individual exits from the job from one
year to another. We do not consider whether a job exit is definite. We add information
on the individuals’ background characteristics from the first wave of each pair of waves,
except for income. For instance, if we select an employed individual in the age range
48-64 in the year 1995, we use the wave in 1996 to check whether a job exit took place,
and use information on assets, debts, marital status, pension scheme participation, etc,
from the May 1995 wave. However, since income refers to the previous fiscal year, we use
income information from the May 1996 wave, which refers to the calendar year (January-
December) 1995. Since the survey in May 1996 collects information on the wage income
earned in 2005 and also on the number of months worked in that year, we can determine
the monthly wage income of each individual in the year 1995, which is assigned to the
monthly wage income earned in May 1995. This example is for the years 1995-1996
but the same holds for any other pairs 1996-1997 through 2001-2002. Self-employed
individuals are excluded: the survey does not apply the questions on assets and debts
to the self-employed. In the waves of 1996 through 2001, information on income in the
previous fiscal year is expressed in guilders. In the year 2002, the information on income
has been collected in euro. We have converted this information in euro to guilders by
multiplying the amount by 2.20371 which is the euro to guilder exchange rate.
Pooling the (pairs of) waves with information on job exits results in 3732 observations.
Because of the panel nature of the survey, individuals who have not yet exited from the
job and are still participating in the survey, may appear in more waves. Thus, the 3732
observations are on 1133 different individuals.
We will discuss the variables that we include in our sample by looking at tables 1
and 2. The tables contain sample descriptives on continuous and count variables (table
13
1) and dummy indicators (table 2). In table 1 we see that the average age (measured
in years) is 52.6. Since we selected individuals in the age range of 48 through 64, this
indicates that there are relatively more ‘younger-elderly’ in our sample. This is related
to higher job exit rates from a certain age on (see later).
The decision to retire may be influenced by the presence of children in the household.
We see that on average there is less than 1 child (0.88) in the household. In table 2 we
see that in 47.0 per cent of the households no child is present (anymore).
There is some information on participation in pension schemes in the survey. The
information on properties of the pension scheme, though, is very limited. Before we
discuss this information, we emphasize that it is not the purpose of this paper to analyse
the impact of the properties of the pension system on job exit: our aim is to measure the
impact of wealth, assets, and debt position on job exit. But participation in a pension
scheme could be a reason for postponing job exit, even if the individual has a high wealth
level, and, moreover, people with a high wealth level also may have a favourable pension
arrangement. So the reason to include this information on pension schemes is, in the
first place, to isolate the impact of wealth on job exit.
In the survey, each individual is asked whether he participates in an employee pension
scheme. Table 2 shows that this is the case for 89.7 per cent of the respondents, whereas
1.8 per cent does not know the answer to this question. Usually, the pension premium is
withheld automatically from the salary, and the worker does not have to undertake any
action to pay the pension premiums. However, 4.1 per cent of the individuals claims to
pay a pension premium directly. For these individuals, information is collected on the
premium contribution paid: the average contribution is 253 guilders. In 73.8 per cent
of the cases the employer contributes to the payment of the premium, according to the
survey respondents.
Some individuals participate in an individual pension scheme, initiated by themselves.
The motives for participating in an individual pension scheme can be quite diverse and
are not recorded in the survey. We can imagine that poor employee pension schemes or
many job changes in the past may add to the participation in individual pension schemes,
but an alternative motive may come from high income people who have more financial
14
means to invest in individual pension schemes. In any case, someone participating in
an individual pension scheme has a certain awareness of his financial situation after
retirement, and including information on participation in individual pension schemes in
the job exit rate may proxy this awareness as well as the ‘true’ impact of the pension
scheme itself. We see that 15.6 per cent of the respondents participates in an individual
pension scheme. The sample average of the monthly contribution is 413 guilders.
We have included some other properties of the job. We see that 31.9 per cent of the
respondents characterize themselves as a civil servant. Early retirement schemes of civil
servants are known to be more generous and wide spread than for workers in the private
sector. At this age, most workers (96.0 per cent) have a ‘permanent’ job.
The longitudinal dataset of the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) provides aggregate mea-
sures of assets and debts. The aggregate measures are computed by aggregating in-
formation on several asset and debt categories. Table 1 contains the averages of these
aggreagate measures. Total liquid wealth is obtained by Statistics Netherlands by aggre-
gating the amounts on the current accounts and savings accounts, bonds, stocks, money
lent, value of jewelry, antiques, and cars.12 The mean value of total liquid assets is 69942.
As the distribution of liquid wealth usually is quite skewed, table 1 also reports the me-
dian, which is 28095. Total debts (excluding the value of mortgage debt outstanding) are
obtained by aggregating personal loans at banks and credit institutions, loans to finance
purchases, and remaining (including money borrowed from family and friends). The
mean value of debt outstanding is only 6907 guilders, and the median is zero, indicating
that over 50 per cent of the respondents has no outstanding debts. Taking the difference
of the aggregate measure for total liquid wealth and debt outstanding gives a measure
of net total liquid wealth. Alternative measures of assets and debts can be obtained by
incorporating the value of the house and the mortgage debt. The average value of the
house of the sample respondents is 322700, and the average mortgage debt is 118070.
In our empirical analysis we will examine the impact of the various measures of wealth
on the job exit probability. Note that the basic theoretical framework of the previous
12 Not every household has possesions in each category. Money in current and savings account is most
common. Jewelry and antiques applies to few households only. In this paper we only consider aggregate
wealth and not the relation between portfolio composition and retirement.
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section uses total net wealth as a variable. Nevertheless it is imaginable that, due to
credit market imperfections, the impact of total assets on the job exit probability need
not necessarily be exactly the opposite of the impact of total debts. Therefore, we will
also allow for differences in the impacts of total assets and debts on job exit.
The avarage monthly wage income is 4724 guilders and the other income is 242
guilders. Both the theoretical model in section 2 and the description of the early re-
tirement system in section 3 show that the future pension benefits are directly based
on the final earnings. We do not include an explicit measure for pension wealth in the
regression model. We do not observe pension wealth in the data, but any constructed
present value measure of future pension benefits would be a function of the observed
final earnings. By including the earnings, we therefore can identify the impact of private
wealth from the impact of pension benefits.
Section 3 also showed that replacement rates and age of eligibility to early retirement
benefits varies by sector. The survey contains detailed information on the industrial
sector of workers. Given the number of transitions observed, we have aggregated infor-
mation on industrial sectors in 12 catergories.
We also make use of indicators for the level of education ranging from primary ed-
ucation (level 1) to university (level 5). In addition, we use indicators for the sector
that respondents have been educated for, including technical, economic/administrative,
general, and services. These sectors are less detailed than the industry dummies. We
use them alternately with the industry dummies. In the empirical analysis we estimate
our base specification with these broad sectors, and we do a sensitivity analysis with the
more detailed industry dummies.
The data contain information on the labour market state of the spouse: 51 percent
of the sample respondents have an employed spouse (about 58.4 percent of the married
men). The labour market state of the spouse may in fact be jointly determined with the
husband’s. Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) model the joint retirement of dual-career
families. Due to possible endogeneity we do not include the spouse’s labour market state
and income in the base specification. However, we carried out a sensitivity analysis to
check whether the impact of wealth on retirement would change if the spouse’s variables
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are included.
We have 3732 pooled observations in our sample of 1133 different individuals that
have been selected on employment status (having a job) and age (48-64), and we track
their labour market state the next year: 211 (5.7 per cent) is observed not to have a job
the next year. Respondents that left their job are asked to report the reason for their job
exit from a list of possibilities. The most important reasons for job exit listed are being
fired, end of contract, shut down of firm, illness/disability, early retirement/living of
one’s investments,13 pensioned, remaining (not specified any further). We have merged
several of these categories. We made a category ‘unemployed’ for being fired, termination
of contract, and shut down of a firm: 15.6 per cent of the job exiters indicate that
unemployment is the reason for job exit. We also merged several categories of retirement.
Note that the retirement categories are self-reported, and that we cannot distinguish
whether someone goes on early retirement according to the narrow definition of the
early retirement system, or whether someone decides to live on interest. Moreover, the
category ‘pensioned’ is also recorded by some job exiters younger than 60, so it can
indicate that the reported ‘being pensioned’ may also include early retirement in the
narrow sense. Therefore, we made one category ‘retirement’: 65.9 per cent of the job
exiters indicates that the job loss is due to retirement. Finally, there is a category
‘remaining’ which does not further specify the reason for job exit. The respondents
could also report job exit for reasons like ‘marriage’, ‘taking care of the children’, and
‘taking care of a family member’, but none of the respondents in our subsample reported
any of these categories as the reason for their job exit. The category ‘remaining’ does
not include these type of reasons for job exit, and it seems likely that it refers to job
quits.
Overall, the job exit rate is 5.7 per cent. The differences by age are however large as
shown in table 4 and figure 1. First, note that the age indicated in the figure and the
table is the age of selection in the sample, while employed, so the job exit takes place 1
year later at the indicated age + 1. The exit rates for the workers in the age range of
48 through 53 is around 1 to 2 percent, and peaking to 44.3 per cent at the age of 60. It
13 In Dutch: ‘rentenieren’.
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should be mentioned that the number of observations decreases with age.14
Unfortunately the survey does not contain information on eligibility to early retire-
ment benefits. Age is an important determinant of eligibility to early retirement and
in the empirical analysis we do a sensitivity analysis with a flexible specification in age,
but different early retirement schemes can have a (somewhat) different age of eligibility.
Moreover, the age of eligibility differs by sector and we analyze the sensitivity of our
results to the inclusion of different sector dummies. Job tenure is also a determinant of
early retirement. Most early retirement schemes in the Netherlands contain the condition
that someone must have worked for the employer the past 10 years to become eligible for
early retirement at the age of eligibility. The survey contains information on the starting
date of the present job, but job tenure itself is an endogenous variable: we model the
probability of job exit, but the probability of observing a given job tenure consists of
a sequence of probabilities of not experiencing a job exit during the length of the job.
This requires the specification of job exit probabilities over the entire past, which will
cover many years out of the sample period. Thus, we abstain from using information on
job tenure. However, note that we include various additional covariates that are likely
to correlate with eligibility to early retirement, like the education level, information on
sectors, on being a civil servant, and participation in pension schemes. Finally, note
that the retirement state as we define it is not restricted to early retirement in the sense
of the early retirement system, but includes retirement, living on one’s investements, as
well as other reasons for job exit.
We do not include explicit information on expected pension benefits, but the theoret-
ical model in section 2 highlighted the role of the current wage in determining the level
of pension benefits. Pension schemes in the Netherlands are of the defined benefit type
and benefits are based in the final wage.
14 We have compared the exit rates by age in our sample with population exit rates provided by
Statistics Netherlands for the years 1999-2001 (see CBS, 2004). The order of magnitude and the age
pattern of the exit rates in our sample compare well with the population rates for the ages of 54 and
higher. For younger ages the exit rates in our sample seem to be systematically lower than the exit
rates reported by Statistics Netherlands.
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5 Empirical analysis
5.1 The empirical model
We use a multinomial logit model to analyse the impact of wealth on job exit. We
aggregate the four reasons to exit a job, listed in table 3, into two categories, to have a
reasonable number of observations in each categorie. We have joined the categorie ‘other’
with the categorie ‘(early) retirement/living of one’s investments’. It is not specified what
are the precise motives to exit for respondents who indicated to have an ‘other’ reason
to exit, but we know that it is not (early) retirement, living of one’s investments, layoff,
termination of contract, shut down of firm, illness and disability, marriage, or taking care
of children or other family members, so it most likely that it represents a voluntarily
job exit, a quit. For this reason it may suit better in the retirement categorie. The
other job exit categorie is unemployment and disability. Figure 2 shows the sample job
exit rates into the combined category unemployment/disability by age. The figure does
not show a clear relationship between age and exit rates into this destination. Figure
3 shows the exit rates into the extended category (early) retirement. The age pattern
resembles the age pattern of the total exit rate in figure 1, although exit rates before age
54 are even smaller. In the figures 4 and 5 we have expressed the use of the different
exit routes by job leavers, split up by age. They show the fraction of job leavers that
use the exit route unemployment/disability (figure 4) and (early) retirement (figure 5).
The figures vertically add up to one, and we see that the use of unemployment/disability
is concentrated among the younger job leavers, whereas older job leavers use (early)
retirement relatively more often. Notably in the age range of 52 through 58 each exit
route is used by some substantial fraction of job leavers. Above the age of 58, the use of
retirement as exit route dominates. A reason for this is the age of the eligibility in early
retirement schemes, in combination with a high fraction of workers that are eligible for
early retirement, the attractiveness of the early retirement scheme relative to other exit
routes, and the eligibility conditions for the other exit routes. Below the age of 52 few
job leavers exit by retirement.
Thus, for an individual i selected in the sample in period t and whose labour market
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state we keep track of in period t + 1, we have three possible values for the outcome
variable dit: staying employed (E), retirement (R), and unemployment/disability (U).
The state of employment is our base category, such that the probabilities we specify
below are job exit probabilities. If xit is a vector of explanatory variables, we specify the
probability of job exit to state J as
P (dit = J |xit) =
exp(xitβJ)
1 + exp(xitβR) + exp(xitβU)
, J = R,U (14)
with βJ , J = R,U the parameter vectors measuring the impact of the explanatory vari-
ables xit on the probability of job exit to state J . For the interpretation of the parameter
estimates it is important to note that the parameter vector βR measures the impact of
the variables xit on job exit into (early) retirement, keeping constant the impact of these
variables on job exit into unemployment/disability. The latter effect is measured by
the parameter βU and affects the probability of job exit into (early) retirement by the
denominator in (14). Thus, βR does not measure the total effect of xit on the probability
of job exit into (early) retirement. This is because of the competing risks nature of the
model. In the extreme case, the total effect of a variable xk,it may be opposite to the
sign of βk,R: if the impact of a variable xk,it on the probability of job exit into (early)
retirement, measured by βk,R is positive, but there is also a very strong positive impact
of this same variable on the probability of job exit into unemployment/disability βk,U ,
the sign of the eventual effect of the job exit probability into (early) retirement may even
reverse. This should be kept in mind when we present and discuss the tables with the
parameter estimates: we will first discuss the estimates (the effects keeping constant job
exit into alternative directions) and thereafter we present elasticities that measure the
total effect of wealth on the job exit probabilities.
The model specification assumes that the explanatory variables xit are uncorrelated
with the errors of the extreme value distribution underlying the multinomial choice model
for dit, and in particular this assumption is made for the wealth variable included in xit.
More specific, the model assumes that there is no correlation in unobservables between
wealth Ait and the labour market state the next period: any possible correlation be-
tween the two runs via the observables that are included in the regression. For this
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reason we include a rich set of regressors to capture any possible correlation. We in-
clude many observable covariates in the job exit probabilities to explain as much of the
possible (spurious) correlation between wealth and job exit as possible. We include the
information on participation in pension schemes, working as a civil servant, working in
a permanent job, as well as income. These are all variables that are likely to correlate
with the level of wealth, but also are likely to influence the probability of job exit. Nev-
ertheless we should be careful in interpreting the impact of wealth on retirement that
we find, especially when it comes to the question whether the effect we find is really a
causal effect
Methods that try to allow for correlation in unobservables have to specify this cor-
relation and moreover rely on exlcusion restrictions for identification. Bloemen (2002)
specifies a model of transitions that includes random effects in the labour market transi-
tions, and a wealth equation with random effects, and allows for correlation in the errors
between the wealth equation and the transition process. His analysis also shows that
it is extremely hard to find suitable exclusion restrictions to allow for endogeneity of
wealth on basis of the theoretical framework outlined in section 2. Finally, note that the
inclusion of random effects in the job exit rates itself, without specifying a process for
wealth, does not solve the endogeneity problem.
5.2 The parameter estimates
Table 5 shows the estimation results of the multinomial logit model including measures
of liquid wealth. Table 5a shows the parameter estimates of the job exit rate into
unemployment, illness, and disability, whereas table 5b shows the results for (early)
retirement. The regression in the first two columns includes total net liquid wealth as
defined in section 3. Although the coefficient estimate of net liquid wealth in the job exit
rate to unemployment/disability is positive, it is not significant at conventional levels.
The 5b shows that total net liquid wealth has a positive and significant effect on the
exit rate into (early) retirement: this is in accordance with the theoretical prediction
outlined in section 2.
Before we continue our presentation of the impact of wealth on the job exit rate,
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we look at the other variables included in the regression. The number of children itself
did not affect the exit rates, but the absence of children in the household has a positive
impact on the job exit rate into (early) retirement: care for children seems to be a motive
to continue working. The results presented in table 5 exclude the number of children, but
inclusion of this variable does not change the impact of wealth that is found. We have
merged singles, divorced, and widows into one category (the base) and only include a
dummy variable for being married. There is weak evidence that married workers exit the
job less often due to unemployment/disability (p-value of 0.101). We have also analyzed
the impact of the inclusion of variables of the spouse. The inclusion of the spouse’s
labour market status and earnings may be criticised for the reason that the labour
market decision of couples may be jointly determined. We have only used the variables
for a sensitivity analyses. We found no impact of the labour market status, the earnings,
and the non-labour income of the spouse on the probability to retire. However, workers
with an employed spouse have a lower probability to exit into unemployment/disability.
The impact of wealth on the job exit rates was not affected by the inclusion of the
variables.
In section 3 we explained that eligibility conditions and replacement rates of pension
benefits can be different for different sectors. The regression in table 5 include different
sectors. It also includes a dummy variable for being a civil servant. The pension fund
for civil servants, the ABP, is the largest pension fund in the Netherlands. We find
no significant effects of the sector dummies. We have also done a sensitivity analysis
with the more detailed industry dummies presented in section 4. The inclusion of these
dummy variables did not change the impact of wealth on the job exit rates that we have
found.
Participation in an employee pension scheme makes it less likely that workers exit
the job by unemployment/disability. Recall that for those who are participating in an
employee pension scheme, we know whether the worker pays the premiums directly, and
if so, we know the premium amount. The amount of the premium was not significant
and is excluded from the regression in the table (but inclusion does not alter the result
on wealth that was found). However, workers who do pay the premium directly have a
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higher job exit rate by both routes. It could indicate that the fact that the worker pays
the premium directly means that he has also more freedom to choose the retirement age,
and eligibility rules may be less stringent. Participation in individual pension schemes
does not seem to affect the job exit rate by any route. Workers with a ‘permanent’ job are
less likely to exit a job by unemployment/disability and are more likely to exit a job by
(early) retirement. The latter probably indicates eligibility to pension benefits of workers
with a ‘permanent’ job. Individuals with the lower levels of education seem to have a
higher probability of job exit into (early) retirement than individuals with the highest
level of education. The monthly wage income does not have a significant influence on
job exit, but the coefficient is positive for both exit routes. Recall that the model in
section 2 implies that there are opposing effects of the wage income on the probability
of job exit. There is a positive income effect that makes it more likely that workers exit
the job the higher is their wage income, but there is a negative effect that is stronger the
lower are the replacement rates of the state of inactivity. The positive coefficient found
suggests that the positive income effect dominates, but it is not strong enough to find a
significant effect of wage income on job exit rates. The impact of other income on the
job exit rates was somewhat puzzling. A priori we may expect that a higher level on
non-labour income makes it more attractive to leave the job, at least if leisure is a normal
good. We first included other income linearly in the job exit rate and found a significant
negative effect on the job exit rate into (early) retirement. However, we found that
this negative effect was driven by the observations with the highest values of non-labour
income: we defined a dummy variable taking the value 1 for workers with more than the
95 per cent quantile of the sample distribution of other income (0 otherwise), and found
that this variable entirely picked up the negative effect. In the regression in table 5, we
have added other income squared. The level of the coefficient of total net liquid wealth
does not change much depending on whether we include other income linearly, add it
squared, or add the dummy variable described above.
We have done sensitivity analyses to find out whether the positive and significant
effect of total net liquid wealth on the job exit rate into (early) retirement may be
caused by some observations in the tails of the distribution of wealth. We defined two
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dummy variables: one dummy variable that takes the value 1 for observations with a
wealth level that exceeds the 95 per cent quantile of the sample distribution (0 otherwise)
and another dummy variable that takes the value 1 for observations with a wealth level
smaller than the 5 percent quantile of the sample distribution of wealth. These dummy
variables turned out not to be significant, whereas the positive significant effect of wealth
on the job exit rate into (early) retirement itself remained. We have also run a regression
with total net liquid wealth squared: both the coefficient of wealth and wealth squared
in the job exit rate into (early) retirement were positive, but the separate coefficients
were not significant, indicating that wealth squared does not add to the explanation of
the job exit rate and there is no such thing like a backward or forward bending pattern
in the relation between wealth and the job exit rate into (early) retirement.
The next move is to look at the impact of alternative measures of wealth. Total
net liquid wealth is obtained by subtracting total debt outstanding (excluding mortgage
debt) from total liquid assets. The theoretical framework in section 2 concentrates on the
impact of net total wealth, but there may be a difference in the separate impacts of assets
and debts on job exit. For this reason, we have estimated the job exit probabilities with
total liquid assets and debts separately. The results are in the final two columns of table
5. Again, we do not see any significant effect of these variables on the job exit probability
into unemployment/disability. Total liquid assets have a positive and significant impact
on the job exit rate into (early) retirement. Total debt shows a negative coefficient
estimate for the job exit probability into (early) retirement, but the coefficient estimate
is not significant. Note that the coefficient of total liquid assets is almost the same as
the coefficient estimate of total net liquid wealth in the first regression. Recall from the
descriptives in section 3 that over 50 per cent of the sample respondents do not have any
debts, and that the mean amount of debts is small compared to the amount of liquid
assets.
There has been a discussion in the literature on the value of the house as a stock
of assets that may be released to finance future consumption (see, for instance, Venti
and Wise (1991)). After retirement, individuals may sell the house, and move into a
smaller and cheaper appartment. Therefore we consider an alternative measure of assets
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and an alternative measure of debts. To the liquid assets considered so far, we add the
value of the house to obtain this alternative measure. Moreover we add the value of the
mortgage debt outstanding to the debts measure used so far. We estimated a multinomial
logit model for the job exit rates including these alternative wealth measures, and the
results can be found in the tables 6a and 6b. Table 6a contains the results for job exit
into unemployment and disability. The first two columns show the impact of total net
wealth. Although the coefficient estimate is positive, it is not significantly different from
zero. The final two columns show the results of the separate inclusion of total assets
and total debt. Again, the coefficients have the predicted sign (the asset coefficient is
positive and the debt coefficient is negative) but they are not significantly different from
zero. Table 6b shows the results on the job exit rate into (early) retirement. Here we see
that total net wealth has a significantly positive effect on the job exit rate into (early)
retirement. If assets and debts are included separately, we also find significant effects: a
higher value of assets increases the job exit rate, and a higher value of debts decreases
the job exit rate into (early) retirement.
This result shows that with different measures of wealth, with entirely different orders
of magnitude (see table 1), we find a positive significant impact of wealth on the prob-
ability of job exit into (early) retirement. However, a significant effect of wealth on job
exit into unemployment/disability cannot be detected. The model in section 2 implies
that wealth enters the job exit rate as a choice factor. In the discussion of the model
in section 2 we concluded that the impact of wealth on job exit will be weakened if job
exit is determined by exogenous lay-off rates or eligibility rules. Finding no significant
effect of wealth on job exit into unemployment/disability suggests that job exit by these
routes are less governed by individual choice and more by demand side and eligibility
factors, in spite of the ‘consensus between employers and workers’ stories about job exit
of elderly workers into unemployment and disability.15
Moreover, the results show that a higher mortgage debt may be a motive for workers
15 This result is not inconsistent with an analysis by Lindeboom (1998), who finds that the replacement
rate of disability (unemployment) insurance benefits has no significant effect on job exit into disability
(unemployment), which also indicates that the possibilities of workers to ‘choose’ for these exit routes
may be limited.
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to postpone retirement from the labour force.
So far we have distinguished two different exit routes, and the different results for the
different exit routes suggest that it is important to make that distinction. However, the
positive effect of wealth on job exit may hold for job exit in general, and moreover, we
may obtain more precise estimates of the effect of wealth on job exit if we merge the job
exit routes into one exit state. Note that the multinomial logit model also allows us to
evaluate the impact of wealth on the total probability of job exit (or, equivalently, on the
staying-on probability), and we will later on present results on elasticities of the staying-
on probability with respect to wealth, but as a sensitivity check we have estimated a
logit model to estimate the impact of wealth on job exit, aggregating the different exit
routes. We do not report complete tables of estimation results, but we mention the key
outcomes. We found a positive effect of total net liquid wealth on the job exit probability,
but it was not significant at the 5 per cent level: its p-value is 0.11. Splitting up total net
liquid wealth into liquid assets and debts (excluding mortgage) again showed a positive
but insignificant effect of liquid assets, and a negative effect of outstanding debt, that
is significant at the 10 per cent level. The results support the importance of making a
distinction between different exit routes: merging exit routes does not lead to a higher
precision of the effect of wealth on job exit, which indicates that the insignificant effect
of wealth on job exit into unemployment and disability, found with the multinomial logit
model, was not just driven by a low number of observations of job exits in this category.
If we add the value of the house to assets and the value of the mortgage to debt, we find
a positive effect of total assets on the job exit probablity that is significant at the 10 per
cent level, and a negative effect of debt that is not significant (with a p-level of 0.11).
5.3 Elasticities
So far we have discussed the coefficient estimates of the multinomial logit model. The
coefficients indicate the impact of the variables on job exit in a given direction, keeping
constant job exit in an other direction. We will now present the total effect of wealth on
the job exit probabilities in different directions, as well as on the staying-on probability,
by presenting the elasticities of these probabilities with respect to wealth. The elasticities
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we present are point elasticities, evaluated at certain values of the explanatory variables.
Note that net wealth is a variable that can take both positive and negative values, but
that need not deteriorate the function of the elasticity as a means to summarize the
impact of wealth on job exit: we will evaluate the elasticity in the sample’s mean and
median values of wealth.
If we denote the job exit probability into direction J, J = U,R, evaluated in charac-
teristics xit by PJ (xit), J = U,R, the elasticity of the probability of job exit into (early)
retirement with respect to variable xk,it is
ǫR,k = βk,Rxk,it(1− PR(xit))− βk,Uxk,itPU (xit) (15)
The form of the elasticity in (15) reveals several properties. First, we see that the
effect βk,U of the variable xk,it on the exit into the alternative exit state of unemploy-
ment/disability, has an opposing effect: if xk,it raises the opportunity to exit by unem-
ployment/disability, its impact on exiting by retirement will be smaller. The size of this
opposing effect also depends on the size of the probability PU (xit) of exiting to that alter-
native state. This is the competing risk property of the multinomial choice framework.
Second, the size of the elasticity is affected by 1−PR(xit). This reflects that the elasticity
is a relative measure: if PR(xit) is small, the relative change in the probability will be
large. For the elasticity of the probability of job exit into unemployment/disability with
respect to variable xk,it we have a similar expression:
ǫU,k = βk,Uxk,it(1− PU(xit))− βk,Rxk,itPR(xit) (16)
The elasticity in (16) is the mirror image of the elasticity in (15). Finally, the elasticity
of the staying-on probability PE(xit) with respect to variable xk,it is
ǫE,k = −βk,Rxk,itPR(xit) − βk,Uxk,itPU (xit) (17)
Since staying employed is chosen as the base category in our multinomial logit model,
the expression (17) for the elasticity of staying employed is built up by the opposite
effects of exiting by any exit route.
The base for evaluating the numerical values of the elasticities are the sample averages
of all of the explanatory variables. Alternatively, we have also evaluated elasticities in
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the median values of wealth, keeping the remaining variables at their sample averages.
Moreover, since the sample average of age is only 52.6 while job exit rates peak at the age
of 60, we have also evaluated elasticities at the age of 60, keeping the other values at their
sample average. Table 7 shows the resulting values of the elasticities. The upper panel
shows the elasticities of the job exit probabilities and the staying-on probability with
respect to net liquid wealth, and is obtained from the estimates in the first columns of
table 5. It shows that the job exit rate into (early) retirement is the most sensitive with
respect to changes in net liquid wealth: the elasticity evaluated in sample averages takes
the value 0.11, which is significantly different from zero. The elasticity of the job exit rate
into unemployment/disability is positive but fairly small and not significantly different
from zero. The elasticity of the staying-on probability with respect to net liquid wealth
is negative but close to zero and insignificant. Evaluated at median wealth (second
column of table 7) the qualitative conclusions remain the same but the quantitative
outcomes differ. The elasticities evaluated at age 60 show some interesting differences.
The elasticity of the job exit probability into unemployment/disability with respect to
net liquid wealth has become negative, but still insignificant, although the coefficient
in table 5 shows a positive effect. This means that in the computation of the elasticity
according to (16) the competing risk effect of transiting into (early) retirement dominates
at age 60. We also see that the staying-on probability is more sensitive with respect to
net liquid wealth at the age of 60, although it remains insignificant. The second panel of
table 7 shows the elasticities of the exit and staying-on probabilities with respect to net
wealth, including the value of the house and the mortgage debt, corresponding to the
estimates in the first columns of table 6. The job exit rate into (early) retirement shows a
higher sensitivity with respect to this measure of wealth, compared to net liquid wealth.
The elasticities for this exit route again are positive and significant. The third and the
fourth panel of table 7 show the elasticities with respect to total assets (liquid + value
of the house) and total debt (including mortgage debt), and correspond to the estimates
in the final two columns of table 6. For total assets, the qualitative results remain the
same as before. However, we see larger values of the elasticities for all the probabilities.
For instance, the elasticity of the job exit probability into (early) retirement, evaluated
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in sample means, now has a value of 0.32, and is significantly positive. The elasticity
of job exit into (early) retirement with respect to total debt is -0.31 and significantly
smaller than zero.
In conclusion we can say that the job exit probability into (early) retirement is the
only probability that reveals significant elasticities with respect to various measures of
wealth, assets, and debt. They have the signs predicted by the theoretical framework.
The probability of exit into unemployment/disability is fairly insensitive with respect to
wealth, assets and, debt. The signs of the elasticities are usually in accordance with the
theoretical predictions, but they are not significant. Even though the exit probability
into (early) retirement shows a significant effect of wealth, we do not find significant
impacts of wealth, assets, and debt on the staying-on probability, if we consider the
staying-on probability as the residual of the exit rates into (early) retirement and un-
employment/disability in the multinomial logit model, but recall that we found some
significant effects if we merge the different exit routes. The effects of wealth, assets, and
debt always have the sign predicted by theory.
5.4 The fit of the model
To give an indication of the fit of the models that we have estimated, we evaluate the
fitted total job exit probability by age for the model variant that includes net liquid
wealth (first columns of table 5). The sample job exit rates have been shown in figure
1, and display a clear peak at the age of 60. It is well known that peaks in empirical
distributions are notoriously difficult to explain by structural economic factors, but the
peak at age 60 would be very easy to reproduce by including a dummy variable for this
age, which is not part of the model specification in table 5. The peak here is undoubtedly
caused by the eligibility rules of the early retirement system. Figure 6 shows the mean
fitted job exit probabilities by age. It shows a small peak at the age of 61, but the drop
in sample job exit rates between the ages of 60 and 64 is not reproduced by the model
specification. Now it should be noted that the purpose of our analysis is not to explain
this peak in the job exit rate: we know where it comes from. Our purpose is to measure
the impact of wealth on the job exit rates. But a legitimate question is whether the
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significant positive impact of wealth on the probability of job exit into (early) retirement
will disappear if we allow for a more flexible specification in age. Therefore, we have
done the following sensitivity analysis. We have specified two age dummies: one dummy
that takes the value one for workers aged 60 (zero otherwise), and another dummy taking
the value one for workers aged 61 through 63 (zero otherwise). We have added these
age dummies to the multinomial logit specification with net liquid wealth, and we have
re-estimated the model. The coefficient estimate of net liquid wealth for exit into (early)
retirement is still positive and significant: it takes the value 0.0172 with a standard error
of 0.0068. This is not much different from the numbers in table 5b. Figure 7 shows
the fitted job exit rates by age for this extended model specification showing a better
fit of the peak at the age of 60. In conclusion we may say that a more flexible model
specification that leads to a better fit of the sample job exit rates does not change the
significant impact of wealth on job exit into (early) retirement.
6 Conclusions
The level of private wealth, assets, and debt may become increasingly important for the
decision of elderly workers to exit from the labour force as policies and trends seem to
move away from social security wealth towards more private wealth. So far, there is little
empirical evidence on the role of individual wealth in the job exit decision, as empirical
studies have concentrated on the attractiveness provided by the exit routes themselves,
like eligibility conditions and replacement rates. In this paper we study the impact of
wealth on the job exit rates of elderly workers. We present a theoretical framework that,
under some regularity conditions, predicts a positive effect of wealth on the decision to
exit a job. The model also generates predictions for the impact of the earnings associated
with the job. On the one hand, the wage income has a positive income effect on the
decision to leave a job, provided that a higher wage income also generates higher benefits
in the subsequent state of inactivity. But this positive impact of the wage income on job
exit may turn negative if replacement rates of the benefits obtained in the inactive states
are low enough and/or if the decision to stop working leads to lower pension benefits in
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future. There are several factors that may complicate the measurement of any effect of
wealth on the job exit rate. First, the level of wealth may be positively correlated with
favourable individual characteristics that may increase the probability to stay on the
job. If individuals with a high level of wealth have better pension arrangements, they
will be less likely to leave the job if that leads to a loss in eligibility to pension rights.
For this reason, we include information on participation in employee pension schemes.
Second, involuntary reasons for leaving a job will weaken the relation between job exit
and wealth, which is a typical choice factor in the job exit rate. Third, eligibility rules
to early retirement benefits may dominate the decision to retire.
For our empirical analysis we use data from the Socio-Economic Panel. We selected
male workers in the age range of 48 through 64, who are present in the panel for two
subsequent waves such that we can observe their labour market state one year later.
Sample exit rates by age remain low until the age of 53, and they peak at the age
of 60. The sample information allows us to distinguish different reasons for job exit.
From this information we construct two different exit routes. The first includes job
exit to (involuntary) unemployment, disability, and illness. The second includes early
retirement, living on one’s investments, and pensioning. The second exit route may a
priori be more likely to be taken by choice, while the first is more likely to be taken
by demand side factors, health risks, and eligibility conditions. However, it has been
argued that transitions into unemployment and disability insurance of elderly workers is
often governed by consensus between workers and employers and therefore may contain
a hidden choice element as well.
We use a multinomial logit framework with three states: (i) exit into (early) retire-
ment; (ii) exit into unemployment/disability; and (iii) our base, staying employed. We
perform analyses with different measures of wealth: liquid wealth, without inclusion of
the value of the house and the mortgage debt, and total wealth that does include the
value of the house and mortgage debt. Moreover, we allow for separate effects of assets
on the one hand, and outstanding debt on the other hand. We find that the two different
measures of net wealth both increase the probability of job exit into (early) retirement,
which is in accordance with the prediction. We do not find a significant effect of any
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of the wealth measures on the probability of job exit into unemployment/disability, al-
though the coefficient estimates are positive. Moreover, we find that splitting up wealth
into assets and debt, shows a significant positive effect of assets (both of liquid as-
sets and assets including the value of the house) and a significant negative impact of
debt (including mortgage debt) on the probability to exit the job by (early) retirement.
These variables show the same signs on the probability of exiting the job into unemploy-
ment/disability, but are not significantly different from zero. Estimates of elasticities
show that also the quantitative impact of wealth, assets, and debt is largest for job exit
into (early) retirement. The impacts of wealth, assets, and debt on total job exit rates,
without distinguishing the state of destination, are less clear. We have analysed total
job exit rates in two ways. First, we have merged the different exit routes and simply
done a logit analysis to analyse the impact of wealth on job exit. We still found some
impact of wealth, assets, and debt on the job exit rate, but p-levels were lower and
sometimes slightly higher than 0.10. Second, the probability of staying-on follows from
the multinomial logit specification, with employment as the base category. We have
computed the elasticities of the probability of staying-on with respect to wealth, assets,
and debt. Although the elasticities always have the signs that may be expected from
theoretical arguments, they are never significant. The analysis shows that it is important
to distinguish different states of destination. An interpretation of not finding a signifi-
cant effect of wealth on job exit into unemployment/disability is that this exit route is
hardly governed by individual choice, as wealth enters the exit rate as a component of
the choice process.
As an additional result of our analysis, we find a positive, but insignificant effect of the
wage income on the probability of job exit by any of the exit routes. The positive effect,
though, suggests that the income effect of the wage income on job exit rates dominates,
which is consistent with the relatively high replacement rates in the Netherlands.
For the interpretation of the impact of wealth on retirement that we have found it is
important to emphasize that the result has been obtained under the assumption that,
conditional on the set of regressors included, there is no unobserved heterogeneity in
wealth that correlates with unobserved heterogeneity in the job exit rates. For this
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reason we have included a rich set of regressors. If the assumption is not satisfied, the
impact of wealth on retirement that we found remains interesting, but it may not be
completely be a causal effect. Many sensitivity analyses have been performed, using
different measures of wealth, and using different regressors, and throughout the impact
of wealth on retirement remained. The inclusion of earnings and industry dummies
allows for the separation of private wealth from pension wealth.
Summarizing we may say that for the years 1995 through 2001, in which eligibility
conditions for (early) retirement schemes were strongly dependent on age and in which re-
placement rates of (early) retirement schemes were relatively high, private wealth affects
the job exit rates of elderly workers into (early) retirement. The role of private wealth
in the retirement decision will increase if individuals obtain more freedom to determine
their age of retirement, but also if replacement rates of pension benefits are decreased
or if the age at which workers become eligible for retirement benefits is increased.
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Table 1: Sample descriptives
Number of observations: N = 3732
Variable Mean standard error
Age 52.6 3.5
# Children living in the household 0.88 1.0
Pension premium (monthly, guilders) 253 398
only for workers participating
in employee pension system
and paying premium directly (N = )
Pension premium (monthly, guilders) 413 651
only for workers participating in
an individual pension scheme
Total liquid assets (guilders) 69942 145187
(Median): (28095)
Total debt outstanding (excl. mortgage) 6907 33610
(Median): (0)
Net total liquid wealth (guilders) 63035 143880
(Median): (24878)
Value of house 322700 363639
(Median) (280000)
Value of mortgage debt outstanding 118070 380134
(Median) (8000)
Total assets (including value house) 392642 443613
(Median): (324950)
Total debt (including mortgage) 110775 122682
(Median): (84750)
Net total wealth (liquid + illiquid) 281867 395804
(Median): (199209)
Net monthly wage income (guilders) 4724 3054
(Median): (4250)
Other income (monthly) 242 (1996)
(Median): (0)
Earnings spouse (monthly, if employed) 1878 (2508)
(Median) (1608)
Other income spouse 938 (7076)
(Median) (0)
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Table 2: Sample descriptives
Number of observations: N = 3732
Percentage
Education Level:
1 (lowest) 6.0
2 14.2
3 47.4
4 21.7
5 9.5
Education type:
Technical 32.1
Economic/administrative 24.8
General 17.5
Services 25.0
No children in the household 47.0
‘Permanent’ job 96.0
Civil servant 31.9
Participating in employee pension scheme 89.7
Unknown whether part. in pens. scheme 1.8
Pays contribution directly 4.1
The employer contributes to premium 73.8
Participates in individial pension scheme 15.6
Married 88.0
Divorced 6.5
Widowed 1.2
Single 4.3
Employed spouse (sample percentage) 51.4
Still employed next year 94.3
Industry:
Agriculture, fishing 1.0
Food, textile 9.0
Chemistry, rubber 4.2
Production of Machines, instruments 7.2
Construction 8.3
Retail and trade 8.9
Transport 8.1
Finance, commercial services 11.8
Public government, education 26.0
Health care 5.7
Remaining services, public utility 4.2
Other, missing 5.5
Wave 1995 12.8
Wave 1996 13.5
Wave 1997 13.7
Wave 1998 14.4
Wave 1999 14.7
Wave 2000 15.9
Wave 2001 15.1
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Table 3: Job leavers: self-reported reasons to exit
Number of Job Leavers 211
Reason for exit Percentage of job leavers
Became unemployed 15.6
Illness Disability 11.9
(Early) retirement/living of one’s investments 65.9
Other 6.6
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Table 4: Job exit rates by age
Number of Job Leavers 211
Number of Stayers 3521
Exit rate (%)
Total 5.7
Age:
48 1.3
49 1.2
50 2.0
51 1.1
52 0.8
53 1.8
54 8.0
55 6.1
56 7.3
57 8.2
58 13.5
59 29.6
60 44.3
61 34.3
62 19.1
63 14.3
64 50.0
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Table 5a: Results of multinomial logit model
with liquid assets and debt outstanding (excl. mortgage)
The Job Exit Rate with Destination Unemployment, Illness, and disability
Net Liquid Wealth Liquid assets and
Debts Separately
Variable Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error
Log-likelihood -682.44 -679.79
Ln Age 365.5 237.7 379.9 239.3
Ln Age Squared -45.6 29.9 -47.4 30.1
Education level 1 (lowest) 0.78 0.82 0.75 0.82
Education level 2 -0.65 0.69 -0.69 0.69
Education level 3 0.18 0.53 0.15 0.53
Education level 4 -0.11 0.57 -0.16 0.57
Technical 0.51 0.39 0.49 0.39
Economic/administrative 0.14 0.42 0.19 0.42
General -0.11 0.58 -0.07 0.58
No Children in household -0.12 0.30 -0.14 0.30
Married -0.62* 0.38 -0.63* 0.38
Civil Servant -0.30 0.36 -0.28 0.36
Part. in employee pension scheme -1.22** 0.61 -1.21** 0.61
Worker pays premium directly 1.26** 0.50 1.33** 0.50
Employer attributes to premium 0.89* 0.54 0.91* 0.54
Permanent job -2.16** 0.39 -2.15** 0.40
Part. in individual pension scheme -0.02 0.38 0.02 0.38
1995 0.25 0.46 0.26 0.46
1996 0.01 0.47 0.00 0.47
1997 -0.23 0.49 -0.19 0.49
1998 -0.31 0.48 -0.29 0.48
1999 -0.45 0.50 -0.44 0.50
2000 -0.55 0.52 -0.56 0.52
Monthly earnings 0.022 0.038 0.024 0.037
Other income/1000 0.46 0.30 0.55* 0.31
Other income/1000 squared -0.043 0.033 -0.047 0.032
Total net liquid wealth/10000 0.00013 0.00932
Total liquid assets/10000 -0.0035 0.0100
Debt/10000 -0.26 0.19
Intercept -733.9 472.9 -762.5 476.0
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Table 5b: Results of multinomial logit model
with liquid assets and debt outstanding (excl. mortgage)
The Job Exit Rate with Destination (Early) Retirement
Net Liquid Wealth Liquid assets and
Debts Separately
Variable Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error
Ln Age 223.0 234.7 230.2 235.3
Ln Age Squared -24.0 29.1 -24.9 29.1
Education level 1 (lowest) 0.91 0.58 0.87 0.58
Education level 2 1.12** 0.48 1.10** 0.47
Education level 3 1.08** 0.44 1.03** 0.44
Education level 4 0.43 0.45 0.37 0.45
Technical -0.10 0.26 -0.11 0.27
Economic/administrative 0.12 0.29 0.16 0.29
General 0.17 0.34 0.17 0.34
No Children in household 0.51** 0.23 0.51** 0.23
Married 0.20 0.29 0.21 0.29
Civil Servant 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.22
Part. in employee pension scheme -0.37 0.36 -0.36 0.36
Worker pays premium directly 0.87** 0.40 0.87** 0.40
Employer attributes to premium -0.22 0.27 -0.22 0.27
Permanent job 1.16** 0.56 1.17** 0.56
Part. in individual pension scheme -0.49 0.34 -0.44 0.35
1995 1.10** 0.37 1.10** 0.37
1996 0.44 0.39 0.44 0.39
1997 0.99** 0.35 1.00 0.35
1998 0.53 0.36 0.54 0.36
1999 0.15 0.38 0.15 0.38
2000 0.27 0.36 0.25 0.36
Monthly earnings 0.023 0.026 0.025 0.025
Other income/1000 -1.01 1.07 -1.05 1.06
Other income/1000 squared -0.61 0.95 -0.58 0.94
Total net liquid wealth/10000 0.0176** 0.0068
Total liquid assets/10000 0.0171** 0.0068
Debt/10000 -0.095 0.066
Intercept -514.4 473.9 -529.0 475.1
**: significant at 5 per cent level
*: significant at 10 per cent level
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Table 6a: Results of multinomial logit model
with assets (including house) and debt (including mortgage)
The Job Exit Rate with Destination Unemployment, Illness, and disability
Net Wealth Assets and
Debts Separately
Variable Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error
Log-likelihood -683.89 -682.01
Ln Age 366.4 237.7 368.1 237.9
Ln Age Squared -45.7 29.9 -45.9 29.9
Education level 1 (lowest) 0.78 0.83 0.75 0.84
Education level 2 -0.65 0.69 -0.68 0.70
Education level 3 0.18 0.53 0.16 0.54
Education level 4 -0.11 0.57 -0.12 0.57
Technical 0.51 0.39 0.51 0.39
Economic/administrative 0.14 0.42 0.14 0.42
General -0.11 0.58 -0.10 0.58
No Children in household -0.12 0.30 -0.12 0.30
Married -0.62 0.38 -0.61 0.38
Civil Servant -0.30 0.36 -0.30 0.36
Part. in employee pension scheme -1.22** 0.61 -1.22** 0.61
Worker pays premium directly 1.26** 0.50 1.26** 0.50
Employer attributes to premium 0.89* 0.54 0.90* 0.54
Permanent job -2.16** 0.39 -2.15** 0.39
Part. in individual pension scheme -0.02 0.38 -0.01 0.38
1995 0.25 0.47 0.24 0.47
1996 0.01 0.48 0.00 0.48
1997 -0.23 0.49 -0.24 0.49
1998 -0.31 0.49 -0.31 0.49
1999 -0.45 0.50 -0.46 0.50
2000 -0.55 0.52 -0.55 0.52
Monthly earnings 0.022 0.038 0.023 0.038
Other income/1000 0.46 0.31 0.47 0.31
Other income/1000 squared -0.043 0.033 -0.043 0.033
Total net weatlh/10000 0.0000044 0.0038
Total assets (incl. house)/10000 0.00010 0.0038
Debt (incl. mortgage)/10000 -0.0030 0.014
Intercept -735.6 472.9 -738.9 473.3
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Table 6b: Results of multinomial logit model
with assets (including house) and debt (including mortgage)
The Job Exit Rate with Destination (Early) Retirement
Net Wealth Assets and
Debts Separately
Variable Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error
Ln Age 269.2 237.4 283.9 238.1
Ln Age Squared -29.7 29.4 -31.6 29.5
Education level 1 (lowest) 0.97 0.59 0.74 0.60
Education level 2 1.21** 0.49 1.01** 0.49
Education level 3 1.16** 0.45 0.98** 0.46
Education level 4 0.49 0.46 0.39 0.46
Technical -0.10 0.26 -0.13 0.27
Economic/administrative 0.14 0.29 0.20 0.29
General 0.17 0.34 0.20 0.35
No Children in household 0.51** 0.23 0.53** 0.23
Married 0.13 0.29 0.22 0.29
Civil Servant 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22
Part. in employee pension scheme -0.37 0.36 -0.39 0.36
Worker pays premium directly 0.86** 0.40 0.84** 0.41
Employer attributes to premium -0.24 0.27 -0.20 0.27
Permanent job 1.10** 0.55 1.14 ** 0.55
Part. in individual pension scheme -0.42 0.34 -0.41 0.34
1995 1.14** 0.38 1.10 0.38
1996 0.49 0.39 0.45 0.39
1997 1.03** 0.35 0.99** 0.35
1998 0.59 0.37 0.56 0.37
1999 0.19 0.38 0.16 0.38
2000 0.28 0.36 0.28 0.36
Monthly earnings 0.024 0.026 0.027 0.025
Other income/1000 -0.74 1.02 -0.90 1.00
Other income/1000 squared -0.63 0.91 -0.57 0.88
Total net wealth/10000 0.00624** 0.00310
Total assets (incl. house)/10000 0.00806** 0.0031
Debt (incl. mortgage)/10000 -0.0283** 0.012
Intercept -607.6 479.3 -636.2 480.8
**: significant at 5 per cent level
*: significant at 10 per cent level
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Table 7: Elasticities of exit and staying on probabilities
with respect to various measures of wealth, assets, and debt
Elasticity Sample average Median for Evaluated
with respect to: for all variables variable that at age 60,
elasticity is sample average
calculated for other variables
Net liquid wealth
Exit to retirement 0.11** 0.049** 0.11**
(0.04) (0.019) (0.04)
Exit to unemp./disab. 0.00077 0.00035 -0.0020
(0.058) (0.026) (0.06)
Staying-on prob. -0.000058 -0.00023 -0.0028
(0.0006) (0.00027) (0.010)
Net wealth (liquid and ill.)
Exit to retirement 0.18** 0.20** 0.17**
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Exit to unemp./disab. 0.000046 0.000050 -0.0042
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Staying-on prob. -0.000077 -0.000091 -0.0043
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.015)
Total assets (liq. and ill.)
Exit to retirement 0.32** 0.30**
(0.12) (0.12)
Exit to unemp./disab. 0.039 -0.0050
(0.15) (0.15)
Staying-on prob. -0.0020 -0.0091
(0.0015) (0.030)
Total debt (incl. mortgage)
Exit to retirement -0.31** -0.30**
(0.14) (0.13)
Exit to unemp./disab. -0.033 -0.024
(0.16) (0.16)
Staying-on prob. 0.00048 0.0092
(0.0016) (0.030)
**: significant at 5 per cent level
*: significant at 10 per cent level
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Figure 1: Exit rate by age
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Figure 2: Exit rate into unemployment/disability by age
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Figure 3: Exit rate into early retirement by age
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Figure 4: Fraction of job leavers exiting by unemp/disability by age
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Figure 5: Fraction of job leavers exiting by (early) retirement by age
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Figure 6: Mean of fitted job exit probabilities
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Figure 7: Fitted job exit probabilites: specification extended with age dummies
